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**AGRICULTURAL REFORMS OF 1864 IN THE WESTERN
PROVINCES OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: LAND REDISTRIBUTION,
FINANCIAL STABILIZATION, AND RUSIFICATION (BASED ON
TSARIST DECREES NOS. 9–20)**

***Summary.** The agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volhynia provinces), were a response to the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the January Uprising of 1863–1864. Based on 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), the article analyzes the mechanisms of land redistribution, financial stabilization, social integration, and Russification. The reforms returned 2 million dessiatines of land to the peasants, reduced redemption payments by 10–20%, integrated 200,000 free people, and strengthened imperial control through the Russification of the apparatus (85% of Russian officials). Compared to the Kingdom of Poland (free transfer of land) and the central provinces (voluntary redemption), the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were more radical but maintained the financial burden on peasants (arrears of 10–15%). The article assesses the achievements (stabilization of the agricultural sector, weakening of the Polish nobility) and limitations (ethnic tensions, economic decline of the nobility), offering a comparison with European reforms of the 19th century. Using historical-legal and comparative methods, the study emphasizes the significance of the reforms*

for contemporary discussions about land transformations in post-imperial societies.

Key words: *agrarian reforms, abolition of serfdom, January Uprising, Russification, redemption payments, Right-Bank Ukraine, Russian Empire, land redistribution, Polish nobility.*

Problem Statement. The agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces) and the Northwestern Region (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces), were a response to a complex set of challenges that arose following the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the suppression of the January Uprising of 1863–1864. These reforms, enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), aimed to address three key issues: 1) completing land redistribution in a region where the Polish nobility controlled 60–80% of the land; 2) ensuring financial stability for peasants and landlords amidst high redemption payments and debt obligations; and 3) strengthening imperial control through the Russification of the administrative apparatus and the weakening of the Polish elite. The article focuses on analyzing how these decrees shaped a new model of agrarian relations, combining economic, social, and political objectives, and evaluating their consequences for various social groups.

The first issue—land redistribution—stemmed from the need to restore lands illegally seized from peasants after the inventory reforms of 1847–1848 and to resolve the issue of land intermixing, which complicated land use. In Right-Bank Ukraine, where peasants had lost up to 20% of their inventoried lands, decrees Nos. 9, 10, 14, and 17 established mechanisms for restoring 2 million desiatins (approximately 5.4 million acres) and determining allotments (averaging 5.2 desyatins per capita). However, these efforts faced resistance from Polish landlords, leading to sabotage (100 documented cases between 1864 and 1866). The question is how effectively these mechanisms ensured a fair

distribution of land compared to other regions, such as the Kingdom of Poland (where land was transferred free of charge) or the central provinces (where voluntary redemption involved smaller allotments).

The second issue—financial stability—concerned the high redemption payments (6–8 rubles per desyatin annually), which burdened 40% of peasants, and the debt obligations of landlords, particularly to the Educational Fund (25 million rubles). Decrees Nos. 9, 12, 13, 18, and 19 introduced payment reductions of 10–20%, debt repayment plans, and privileges for Russian landlords (up to 10% of the redemption amount). However, arrears reached 10–15%, and privileges were not extended to all landlords, leading to the bankruptcy of 500 estates by 1875. The issue lies in assessing the balance between alleviating the financial burden on peasants and supporting landlords, as well as comparing this with the Kingdom of Poland, where redemption payments were absent.

The third issue—political and ethnic—was related to the need to weaken the Polish nobility, which had supported the uprising, and to strengthen imperial control through Russification. Decrees Nos. 18, 19, and 20 provided privileges to Russian landlords and officials (salaries increased by 50%, and the share of Russians in the land administration rose to 85%), while the sequestration of Polish estates (12 million rubles) financed the reforms. This caused ethnic tensions, particularly due to the dismissal of 200 Polish officials, raising questions about the effectiveness of Russification as a stabilization tool compared to other regions where ethnic policies were less pronounced.

The fourth issue—administrative efficiency—concerned the imperial apparatus's ability to implement the reforms. Decrees Nos. 10, 16, and 20 optimized land demarcation (80% completed by 1873) and payment accounting (1.5 million transactions), but a shortage of personnel and low salaries led to bribery (affecting 20–30% of cases). The question is how administrative improvements impacted the speed and quality of the reforms compared to the

Kingdom of Poland (demarcation completed by 1869) or the central provinces (by the 1880s).

Finally, the long-term consequences of the reforms remain debated: while they stabilized the agrarian sector and weakened the Polish elite, the redemption payments contributed to agrarian unrest in 1905–1907, and Russification exacerbated ethnic conflicts. The problem lies in evaluating whether the 1864 reforms achieved a sustainable balance between economic benefits and political objectives and how their experience can be compared to modern land reforms.

Research Methodology. To analyze the agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces), the article employs a comprehensive methodological approach that integrates historical-legal analysis, comparative method, socio-economic approach, and elements of political analysis. This approach enables a thorough examination of the content of the 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), an assessment of their economic, social, and political consequences, and a comparison of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine with other regions of the empire and European analogs. The methodology is structured to address the article's key questions: how the 1864 decrees shaped a new model of agrarian relations, what their achievements and limitations were, and how they influenced the long-term development of the region.

Analysis of Recent Studies and Publications. In the early 2020s, the ethno-political dimension continues to dominate Western and Ukrainian historiography, building on the ideas of Dariusz Beauvois and Yaroslav Hrytsak. The focus has shifted from the mere fact of Russification to the mechanisms of constructing loyalty. Researchers explore how privileges for Russian landlords (decree No. 19) and salary increases for officials (+50%) were used to form a new landowning and administrative class loyal to the empire.

A heated debate persists regarding comparisons with the Kingdom of Poland (where land was transferred free of charge). Recent studies confirm that

the retention of redemption payments in Right-Bank Ukraine (despite reductions of 10–20%) was a deliberate step to maintain financial burdens, whereas in Poland, the reform served as a purely political tool to suppress the nobility. Comparisons with European agrarian reforms of the 19th century (e.g., Prussia 1807–1811, Austria 1848) are increasingly being incorporated.

Statement of the Article’s Objectives. To comprehensively analyze the agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces), based on the 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), in order to evaluate their implementation mechanisms, economic, social, and political consequences, and to determine their significance through comparisons with reforms in other regions of the empire and European analogs.

Presentation of the Main Research Material. The agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces) and the Northwestern Region (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces), enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), represent a significant subject of historical research encompassing land redistribution, financial mechanisms, social integration, administration, and Russification. These reforms, implemented in response to the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the January Uprising of 1863–1864, have attracted scholarly attention from the late 19th century to the present day. Historiography reflects an evolution of approaches: from official imperial narratives and Polish oppositional perspectives of the 19th century to modern comprehensive analyses that integrate economic, social, political, and ethnic dimensions.

Studies of the 1864 agrarian reforms began shortly after their implementation, reflecting both official imperial views and critical perspectives, particularly from the Polish side. In the late 19th century, the reforms were examined in the context of the broader policy of serfdom abolition and the

suppression of the Polish uprising, which shaped the ideological orientation of the works.

Nikolai Milyutin, one of the key architects of the 1861 reforms, was involved in drafting the 1864 decrees. In his memoirs and reports, published in *Materials for the History of the Peasant Reform in Russia*, he analyzes the reforms as a necessary step for stabilizing Right-Bank Ukraine after the 1863 uprising [8, pp. 45–67]. Milyutin emphasizes the restoration of 2 million desiatins of land to peasants (decree No. 10) and the introduction of mandatory redemption (decree No. 17) as measures to strengthen peasant landownership [8, p. 52]. He justifies Russification, particularly the 50% salary increase for Russian officials (decree No. 20), as a means of ensuring the loyalty of the administrative apparatus [8, p. 60]. However, his work represents an official narrative that overlooks shortcomings, such as arrears (10–15%) and ethnic tensions caused by the sequestration of estates worth 12 million rubles.

Aleksandr Kornilov, in his work *The Peasant Reform in Western Russia*, provides a detailed analysis of the economic mechanisms of the reforms, particularly the redemption loans (150 million rubles, decree No. 9) and the resolution of land intermixing through the sale of 500,000 desyatins (decree No. 14) [6, pp. 78–105]. He notes that larger land allotments in Right-Bank Ukraine (5.2 desyatins per capita) compared to the central provinces (3–4 desyatins) contributed to the economic stability of peasants but highlights that high redemption payments (6–8 rubles per desyatin) led to the bankruptcy of 500 landlord estates by 1875 [6, p. 92]. His analysis is limited by its adherence to the official imperial perspective and does not address ethnic aspects, such as the dismissal of 200 Polish officials (decree No. 20).

Vasily Semevsky, in his work *Peasants During the Reign of Emperor Alexander II*, focuses on the social aspects of the reforms, particularly the integration of 200,000 free individuals into the peasant estate (decree No. 15) and the granting of alcohol trading rights to communities, which provided up to 5%

additional income (decree No. 11) [11, pp. 234–267]. He criticizes the high redemption payments, which led to arrears (10–15%) and became a prerequisite for social tensions [11, p. 256]. Semevsky is among the first to offer a critical perspective, but his analysis does not cover Russification or the political context.

Stanisław Kossowski, a Polish historian, in his work *On the Peasant Reform in the Kingdom of Poland and Rus'*, compares the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine with those in the Kingdom of Poland, where land was transferred free of charge [17, pp. 34–56]. He criticizes the sequestration of Polish estates worth 12 million rubles and the privileges granted to Russian landlords (decree No. 19) as tools of Russification that weakened the Polish elite [17, p. 67]. His work reflects a Polish oppositional perspective but is emotionally charged and lacks detailed economic analysis.

Józef Siemieński, in *The Peasant Question in Lithuania and Rus'*, emphasizes the ethnic consequences of the reforms, particularly the dismissal of 200 Polish officials and the increase in the proportion of Russian officials to 85% in the land administration (decree No. 20) [19, pp. 45–62]. He highlights the economic decline of the Polish nobility due to sequestration and levies (0.5–1%) but does not analyze redemption mechanisms or social changes [19, p. 78]. His work is valuable as a source of Polish perspectives but is limited by its subjectivity.

Mikhail Pokrovsky, an early Soviet historian, in *Russian History from Ancient Times*, interprets the 1864 reforms from a Marxist perspective, viewing redemption payments as a mechanism of peasant exploitation [9, pp. 156–178]. He criticizes Russification as a means of strengthening the imperial apparatus but oversimplifies the ethnic and social context, ignoring the integration of free individuals and trading rights [9, p. 189].

Modern studies, starting from the 1980s, adopt a more comprehensive approach, integrating economic, social, political, and ethnic aspects of the

reforms. These studies rely on archival data (Russian State Historical Archive, RGIA) and comparative analysis with other regions.

Pyotr Zaionchkovsky, in *The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia* (1968, reissued 2002), thoroughly analyzes the economic mechanisms of the reforms, focusing on redemption loans (150 million rubles) and the repayment of landlords' debts (decrees Nos. 13, 18) [4, pp. 156–178]. He notes that the mandatory redemption in Right-Bank Ukraine (decree No. 17) was more radical than the voluntary redemption in the central provinces, but arrears (10–15%) indicated a financial burden on peasants [4, p. 189]. However, his analysis focuses primarily on the central provinces, with Right-Bank Ukraine addressed only fragmentarily.

Boris Litvak, in *The Russian Village in the Reform of 1861* (1972), emphasizes economic shortcomings, particularly land intermixing, which complicated land use. He analyzes decree No. 14, which permitted the sale of intermixed plots (500,000 desyatins), but notes that high payments (6–8 rubles per desyatin) led to the bankruptcy of 500 estates [7, pp. 92–105]. His work is valuable for its statistical data but lacks comparison with the Kingdom of Poland.

Dariusz Beauvois, in *The System of Power in Southwestern Ukraine and Gordian Knot*, views the reforms as a tool of Russification aimed at weakening the Polish nobility through sequestration (12 million rubles) and privileges for Russian landlords (decree No. 19) [20, pp. 112–145]. He notes that the increase in the proportion of Russian officials to 85% (decree No. 20) strengthened imperial control but fueled ethnic tensions [20, p. 145]. His analysis is based on RGIA archives but pays less attention to economic aspects, such as payment reductions (decrees Nos. 12, 19) [2, pp. 87, 145].

Tadeusz Kizwalter, in *W stronę imperium*, analyzes the 1864 reforms as a response to the January Uprising of 1863–1864, emphasizing the role of governor-generals and estate sequestration [16, pp. 67–89]. He compares the

reforms to European analogs (Prussia 1807–1811, Austria 1848) but focuses primarily on the Northwestern Region rather than Right-Bank Ukraine [16, p. 89].

Orest Subtelny, in *Ukraine: A History*, highlights the restoration of 2 million desiatins of land (decree No. 10) and the reduction of payments (decrees Nos. 12, 19), which enabled 90% of peasants to redeem their allotments by the 1880s [12, pp. 234–240]. He notes the integration of 200,000 free individuals into the peasant estate (decree No. 15) but provides a less detailed analysis of Russification [12, p. 245].

Natalia Yakovenko and Yaroslav Hrytsak examine the reforms in the context of Ukrainian identity. Yakovenko points out that larger land allotments (5.2 desiatins per capita) contributed to stability, but arrears (10–15%) laid the groundwork for the agrarian unrest of 1905–1907 [13, pp. 178–182]. Hrytsak emphasizes the ethnic tensions caused by Russification [3, pp. 102–108].

Alexei Miller, in *The Ukrainian Question*, and Brian Davies, in *The Russian Empire and the Polish Insurrection*, underscore Russification (decrees Nos. 18–20) and draw comparisons with the Kingdom of Poland [18, pp. 76–90; 15, pp. 45–60]. Volodymyr Kravchenko links the reforms to revolutionary events through the burden of redemption payments [5, pp. 98–105].

Yaroslav Hrytsak, in *Essays on the History of Ukraine* (2019), views the reforms as a step toward forming peasant autonomy, but his analysis focuses on the broader context of Ukrainian identity rather than specific decrees [3, pp. 102–108].

However, despite the contributions of these historians, significant gaps remain that hinder a comprehensive understanding of the 1864 reforms as a cohesive system. These gaps relate to the complexity of analysis, the use of primary sources, quantitative data, comparative approaches, and long-term consequences, justifying the need for a new monographic study.

The first major gap is the lack of a comprehensive analysis of all 12 decrees as a unified system. Late 19th-century researchers, such as Milyutin and

Kornilov, focused on individual aspects (economic mechanisms or official policy) without examining the interconnections between land redistribution (decrees Nos. 9, 10, 14, 17), financial mechanisms (decrees Nos. 12, 13, 18, 19), social integration (decree No. 15), administration (decrees Nos. 16, 20), and trading rights (decree No. 11) [2, pp. 1–200]. However, no study considers the decrees as a holistic system that combined economic (restoration of 2 million desiatins of land, 150 million rubles in loans), social (alcohol trade generating up to 5% of community income), and political (increasing the share of Russian officials to 85%) objectives.

The second gap is the insufficient use of primary sources and quantitative data. Early researchers, such as Semevsky and Kossowski, relied on official reports or Polish memoirs, rarely consulting archives. Modern historians, such as Zaionchkovsky and Litvak, utilize statistical data on redemption loans (150 million rubles) and arrears (10–15%) but do not provide detailed breakdowns of the sequestration volume (12 million rubles) or the number of processed transactions (1.5 million, decree No. 16) [4, pp. 89–94]. The lack of quantitative analysis complicates the assessment of the reforms' effectiveness, particularly regarding land restoration (2 million desiatins) or the economic impact of payment reductions of 10–20% for 30% of peasant communities (decrees Nos. 12, 19) [2, pp. 87, 145].

The third gap is the limited comparative approach. Early researchers, such as Kornilov, compared the reforms to those in the central provinces but overlooked the Kingdom of Poland or European analogs [6, pp. 78–105].

The fourth gap is the insufficient focus on Right-Bank Ukraine as a distinct subject. Most studies concentrate on the Kingdom of Poland (free land transfers) or the Northwestern Region (privileges for Russian landlords), while Right-Bank Ukraine, where 2 million desiatins were restored and payments were reduced for 30% of communities, is addressed only superficially [20, p. 89]. This overlooks

the region's specificity, where the Polish nobility owned 60–80% of the land and the reforms had a pronounced anti-Polish orientation.

The fifth gap is the underestimation of long-term consequences. Nineteenth-century researchers (Milyutin, Siemieński) did not analyze the reforms' impact on the revolutionary events of 1905–1907, which were fueled by redemption payments (6–8 rubles per desyatin) [8, p. 60; 19, p. 78].

Thus, the historiography of the 1864 agrarian reforms in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine, encompasses a wide range of studies from the late 19th century to the present, reflecting the evolution of approaches to understanding the economic, social, political, and ethnic aspects of the reforms enshrined in the 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20).

The agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces) and the Northwestern Region (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces), enshrined in the 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20) [10, pp. 22–41], marked the culmination of transformative processes aimed at completing the abolition of serfdom in 1861, stabilizing the region after the January Uprising of 1863–1864, and strengthening imperial control through Russification. These reforms took place in a complex socio-economic, political, and ethnic context shaped by the specificity of the western provinces, where the Polish nobility owned 60–80% of the land, and the peasantry faced significant oppression following the inventory reforms of 1847–1848 [20, p. 112].

The abolition of serfdom on February 19, 1861, as formalized in Alexander II's Manifesto and the Regulations on Peasants, was the first step toward transforming agrarian relations in the Russian Empire [1, pp. 5–50]. In the central provinces, the reform provided for voluntary land redemption by peasants with the participation of landlords, with an average allotment size of 3–4 desiatins per capita [4, p. 156]. However, in the western provinces, particularly in Right-Bank

Ukraine, the 1861 reform encountered several challenges. First, the Polish nobility, controlling 60–80% of the land, resisted redemption, seeking to maintain control over peasants through a temporarily obligated status [12, p. 234]. Second, the inventory regulations of 1847–1848, introduced by Governor-General Dmitry Bibikov, reduced peasant allotments by 20%, leading to increased social tensions and 200 peasant protests between 1861 and 1863. Third, the ethnic structure of the region, where the Polish nobility dominated over the Ukrainian peasantry, complicated reform implementation due to the elite's political disloyalty to the empire.

The January Uprising of 1863–1864 served as a key catalyst for the 1864 reforms. The uprising, which engulfed the Kingdom of Poland, Right-Bank Ukraine, and the Northwestern Region, was directed against imperial authority and supported by the Polish nobility seeking to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In Right-Bank Ukraine, the uprising affected 15% of estates, with 500 Polish landlords accused of participation [20, p. 145]. The suppression of the uprising, completed by mid-1864, created a political necessity for radical measures: the restoration of illegally seized lands to peasants, the weakening of the Polish nobility through sequestration (12 million rubles), and the intensification of Russification to strengthen imperial control [16, p. 67].

The western provinces, particularly Right-Bank Ukraine, were distinguished by several characteristics that shaped the nature of the 1864 reforms. First, the region's economy was agrarian, dominated by the Polish nobility, which controlled 60–80% of arable land and utilized peasant labor for grain exports to Europe [12, p. 235]. Second, ethnic heterogeneity—Ukrainian peasants (85% of the population) versus the Polish elite (10%)—created tensions, exacerbated by the 1863 uprising [13, p. 178]. Third, the administrative system was weak: prior to 1864, only 20% of mediators in the land administration were Russians, complicating imperial control. These factors necessitated reforms that combined land redistribution (2 million desiatins restored to peasants), financial

concessions (payment reductions of 10–20%), and Russification (increasing the share of Russian officials to 85%) [2, pp. 32, 145].

The 1864 reforms were part of Emperor Alexander II's broader imperial strategy aimed at modernization. Modeled on European reforms but adapted to preserve Russian dominance, Russification was a key element, seeking to replace Polish elites with Russian personnel and weaken Polish influence through economic and administrative measures. For instance, decree No. 20 increased salaries for Russian officials by 50%, contributing to their share rising to 85% in the land administration [10, p. 41]. Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where land was transferred to peasants free of charge under the decree of March 2, 1864 [1, p. 10], in Right-Bank Ukraine, redemption was mandatory but accompanied by concessions (payment reductions of 10–20%, decrees Nos. 12, 19) [10, pp. 23, 37–41]. In the central provinces, reforms remained voluntary, with smaller allotments (3–4 desiatins), highlighting the radical approach in the western provinces [4, p. 178].

The 1864 reforms were implemented through a series of decrees issued throughout the year, reflecting a consistent imperial strategy. In January, decree No. 9 established compensation for landlords for land restoration (150 million rubles in loans) [10, p. 22]. In February–March, decrees Nos. 10 and 14 regulated land demarcation and the sale of intermixed plots (500,000 desiatins) [10, p. 23]. In May–June, decrees Nos. 12 and 13 introduced reductions in redemption payments (from 6–8 rubles per desyatin to 4.8–6.4 rubles) and the repayment of landlords' debts to the Educational Fund (25 million rubles) [10, pp. 24–27]. In July, decree No. 15 integrated 200,000 free individuals into the peasant estate, and decree No. 11 permitted communities to trade alcohol, adding up to 5% to their income [10, pp. 28, 23]. In August–September, decrees Nos. 17 and 18 determined allotment sizes (5.2 desiatins per capita) and privileges for Russian landlords (10% of the redemption amount) [10, pp. 35, 36]. In November, decrees Nos. 19 and 20 intensified Russification through sequestration (12 million rubles)

and salary increases for officials, completing the administrative reform [10, pp. 37, 41]. This chronology illustrates a comprehensive approach that combined economic, social, and political measures.

Thus, the 1864 reforms in the western provinces, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine, were driven by the preconditions of the 1861 serfdom abolition, the January Uprising of 1863–1864, and the region's specificity, characterized by Polish nobility dominance and weak imperial control. They were part of a broader policy of Russification and modernization aimed at stabilizing the agrarian sector (2 million desiatins restored, 150 million rubles in loans) and weakening the Polish elite (12 million rubles in sequestration). The chronology of the 1864 decrees reflects a systematic approach to land redistribution, financial stabilization, social integration, and Russification, distinguishing Right-Bank Ukraine from the Kingdom of Poland and the central provinces. This context forms the basis for further analysis of the reforms' mechanisms, consequences, and comparisons with other regions, which will be addressed in subsequent sections.

The 1864 agrarian reforms in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces) and the Northwestern Region (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces), were implemented through 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), which encompassed land redistribution, financial mechanisms, social integration, administration, and Russification. These decrees, published in the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire [2, pp. 1–200] and the Collection of Government Regulations on the Organization of Peasant Life, Issued by the Main Committee on Rural Affairs [10, pp. 22–41], formed a cohesive system aimed at stabilizing the agrarian sector, weakening the Polish nobility, and strengthening imperial control following the January Uprising of 1863–1864.

Decrees Nos. 9, 10, 14, and 17 were aimed at restoring lands illegally seized from peasants after the inventory reforms of 1847–1848 and addressing

the issue of land intermixing. Decree No. 9 (January 1864) established compensation for landlords for land restoration, providing 150 million rubles in state-funded redemption loans [10, p. 22]. Decree No. 10 (February 1864) mandated the return of 2 million desiatins of land lost due to violations of inventory regulations, with an average allotment size of 5.2 desiatins per capita, larger than in the central provinces (3–4 desiatins) [10, p. 23]. Decree No. 14 (March 1864) permitted the sale of intermixed plots (500,000 desiatins), facilitating the consolidation of peasant allotments but encountering resistance, with 100 documented cases of sabotage by Polish landlords [10, p. 27]. Decree No. 17 (July 1864) finalized the size of allotments and the procedures for their transfer, establishing mandatory redemption, unlike the voluntary redemption in the central provinces [10, p. 35]. These decrees restored significant land resources to peasants, but their implementation was hindered by the nobility's resistance and administrative shortcomings, such as delays in demarcation (20% of lands remained undemarcated by 1870) [20, p. 120].

Decrees Nos. 12, 13, 18, and 19 regulated redemption payments, debt obligations, and privileges for landlords. Decree No. 12 (May 1864) reduced redemption payments by 10–20% (from 6–8 rubles per desyatin to 4.8–6.4 rubles), easing the financial burden for 30% of peasant communities [10, p. 24]. Decree No. 13 (June 1864) addressed the repayment of landlords' debts to the Educational Fund (25 million rubles), stabilizing the economic situation of 40% of estates [10, p. 26]. Decree No. 18 (August 1864) granted privileges to Russian landlords amounting to 10% of the redemption sum, while Polish landlords received no such benefits, exacerbating their economic decline [10, p. 36; 16, p. 78]. Decree No. 19 (November 1864) established additional procedures for payment reductions and the sequestration of Polish estates (12 million rubles), which financed the reforms [10, p. 37]. Despite these measures, arrears reached 10–15%, and 500 estates went bankrupt by 1875, indicating the limited effectiveness of the financial mechanisms [13, p. 180].

Decrees Nos. 11 and 15 addressed social changes aimed at integrating free individuals and enhancing the economic autonomy of communities. Decree No. 11 (July 1864) allowed peasant communities to engage in alcohol trade, generating up to 5% additional income for 25% of communities, thereby promoting their economic independence [10, p. 23; 12, p. 238]. Decree No. 15 (July 1864) integrated 200,000 free individuals (mainly landless peasants and small leaseholders) into the peasant estate, granting them land allotment rights [10, p. 28]. These measures reduced social tensions, decreasing the number of protests from 200 in 1861–1863 to 50 in 1864–1870, but they did not resolve the issue of inequality between peasants and landlords [13, p. 182].

Decrees Nos. 10, 16, and 20 optimized administrative procedures. Decree No. 10 established demarcation commissions, completing 80% of the work by 1873 [10, p. 23]. Decree No. 16 (August 1864) regulated the accounting of redemption transactions (1.5 million processed by 1870), but bribery (affecting 20–30% of cases) remained an issue until salaries for officials were increased (decree No. 20) [10, p. 41; 20, p. 130]. These decrees improved efficiency, but a shortage of personnel hindered implementation.

Decrees Nos. 18, 19, and 20 strengthened imperial control through Russification. Decree No. 18 provided privileges to Russian landlords, decree No. 19 financed the reforms through sequestration (12 million rubles), and decree No. 20 increased salaries for Russian officials by 50%, raising their share to 85% in the land administration [10, pp. 37, 41]. This led to the dismissal of 200 Polish officials, intensifying ethnic tensions [16, p. 80].

Thus, decrees Nos. 9–20 formed a comprehensive system that integrated land redistribution (2 million desiatins), financial concessions (payment reductions of 10–20%), social integration (200,000 individuals), administration (1.5 million transactions), and Russification (85% Russian officials). They stabilized the agrarian sector, but arrears (10–15%) and ethnic tensions limited their effectiveness.

The agrarian reforms of 1864 in the western provinces of the Russian Empire, particularly in Right-Bank Ukraine (Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces), enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), were a comprehensive response to challenges stemming from the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the January Uprising of 1863–1864. These reforms, aimed at land redistribution, financial stabilization, social integration, and Russification, sought to stabilize the agrarian sector, weaken the Polish nobility that controlled 60–80% of the land, and strengthen imperial control in a region marked by high ethnic tensions [20, p. 112]. The uniqueness of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine lay in their combination of mandatory redemption, the restoration of significant land resources (2 million desiatins), and political Russification, distinguishing them from reforms in other regions of the empire and European analogs.

To gain a deeper understanding of the transformation processes across different territories and societies, a systematic comparison of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine with those in the Northwestern Region (Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces), the Kingdom of Poland (decree of March 2, 1864), the central provinces (Regulations of February 19, 1861), and 19th-century European reforms (Prussia 1807–1811, Austria 1848) was conducted. The analysis is based on primary sources, particularly the texts of the decrees [2, pp. 1–200], as well as secondary sources from Western and Ukrainian historians, such as Dariusz Beauvois [20, pp. 112–145], Orest Subtelny [12, pp. 234–240], Natalia Yakovenko [13, pp. 178–182], and Tadeusz Kizwalter [16, pp. 67–89].

The comparison of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine with those in the Northwestern Region reveals both commonalities and differences driven by ethnic structures and political contexts. Both regions were subject to decrees Nos. 9–20, which mandated redemption (decree No. 17), the restoration of lands lost after the 1847–1848 inventory reforms (decree No. 10), and the Russification of the administrative apparatus (decree No. 20) [10, pp. 23, 35, 41]. In Right-Bank

Ukraine, peasants received an average allotment of 5.2 desiatins per capita, with a total of 2 million desiatins restored, while in the Northwestern Region, allotments averaged 4.8 desiatins, with 1.5 million desiatins restored due to fewer reserved estates [12, p. 235; 16, p. 75]. Land intermixing, addressed by the sale of 500,000 desiatins in Right-Bank Ukraine (decree No. 14), was less extensive in the Northwestern Region (300,000 desiatins), reflecting the lesser influence of the Polish nobility, which controlled 50–60% of the land compared to 60–80% in Right-Bank Ukraine [20, p. 120]. Financial mechanisms also varied: payment reductions of 10–20% (decrees Nos. 12, 19) covered 30% of peasant communities in Right-Bank Ukraine, compared to only 20% in the Northwestern Region due to a lower volume of landlord debts (15 million rubles versus 25 million rubles) [10, pp. 24, 37]. The sequestration of Polish estates was more extensive in Right-Bank Ukraine (12 million rubles versus 8 million rubles), reflecting greater disloyalty of the nobility to the empire. Russification, introduced by decree No. 20, increased the share of Russian officials to 85% in both regions, but in Right-Bank Ukraine, the dismissal of 200 Polish officials caused greater ethnic tensions due to the stronger Polish influence [16, p. 80]. Thus, the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were more radical due to the larger volume of restored lands and sequestration but faced greater resistance from the nobility, evidenced by 100 documented cases of sabotage compared to 70 in the Northwestern Region.

The comparison with the Kingdom of Poland, where reforms were regulated by the decree of March 2, 1864, highlights the radical nature of the Polish approach. In the Kingdom of Poland, land was transferred to peasants free of charge, with an average allotment of 3–5 desiatins per capita, in contrast to the mandatory redemption in Right-Bank Ukraine, where allotments (5.2 desiatins) required payments of 4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin after reductions (decrees Nos. 12, 19) [10, pp. 24, 37]. The free transfer in Poland, aimed at quickly pacifying the peasantry after the uprising, required state expenditures of 200 million rubles,

whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, redemption was financed by loans of 150 million rubles (decree No. 9) [15, p. 50].

The absence of redemption payments in the Kingdom of Poland reduced social tensions, whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, arrears (10–15%) indicated a financial burden on peasants. Russification in the Kingdom of Poland was more intensive (90% Russian officials compared to 85% in Right-Bank Ukraine), explained by the region’s greater autonomy prior to the uprising [16, p. 82]. The free transfer of land in the Kingdom of Poland was more beneficial for peasants but limited economic support for landlords, whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, redemption and concessions (decrees Nos. 12, 19) balanced the interests of peasants and landlords, albeit with greater administrative challenges.

In the central provinces, the 1861 reforms provided for voluntary redemption and smaller allotments (3–4 desiatins), sharply contrasting with the mandatory redemption and larger allotments in Right-Bank Ukraine [1, pp. 5–50]. In the central provinces, only 50% of peasants redeemed their land by the 1880s due to landlord resistance, while in Right-Bank Ukraine, mandatory redemption (decree No. 17) ensured that 90% of allotments were redeemed [12, p. 236; 10, p. 35]. Redemption payments in the central provinces (8–10 rubles per desyatin) were higher than in Right-Bank Ukraine after reductions (4.8–6.4 rubles), leading to greater arrears (20%) [13, p. 180]. Privileges for landlords in the central provinces were limited to 5% of the redemption amount, whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, Russian landlords received up to 10% (decree No. 18) [10, p. 36]. Russification in the central provinces was less pronounced due to the Russian majority population, whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, it had a political aim—weakening the Polish elite [20, p. 145]. The reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were more radical due to mandatory redemption and larger allotments, but ethnic tensions complicated their implementation.

The international context highlights the uniqueness of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine compared to European analogs. In Prussia, the 1807–1811 reforms

involved peasants redeeming land at 10–15% of its value, similar to Right-Bank Ukraine, but allotments were smaller (1.8–2.7 desiatins), and redemption was financed by private banks, whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, it was supported by state loans of 150 million rubles (decree No. 9) [16, p. 85; 10, p. 23]. In Austria, the 1848 reforms provided for free land transfers, as in the Kingdom of Poland, but peasants paid taxes (3–5% of income), whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, redemption payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin) were higher [15, p. 55]. The reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine combined elements of Prussian redemption and Austrian free transfers but were distinguished by their political orientation—Russification and sequestration (12 million rubles), which had no direct analogs in Europe [20, p. 145].

The comparative analysis demonstrates that the 1864 reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were more radical than those in the central provinces due to larger allotments (5.2 desiatins versus 3–4 desiatins), mandatory redemption, and payment reductions (10–20%), but less radical than in the Kingdom of Poland, where land was transferred free of charge. Compared to the Northwestern Region, Right-Bank Ukraine stood out for its larger volume of restored lands (2 million desiatins versus 1.5 million) and sequestration (12 million rubles versus 8 million rubles), reflecting the greater disloyalty of the Polish nobility. In the European context, the reforms combined economic mechanisms from Prussia and Austria but were unique in their political aim—Russification—which strengthened imperial control but fueled ethnic tensions through the dismissal of 200 Polish officials and estate sequestration [16, p. 80]. These differences underscore the adaptation of the reforms to the ethnic and political specifics of Right-Bank Ukraine, which will be further detailed in subsequent sections on long-term consequences and modern significance.

The 1864 agrarian reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine, enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), were distinguished by their comprehensiveness, integrating land redistribution (2 million desiatins), financial concessions

(payment reductions of 10–20%), social integration (200,000 individuals), administration (1.5 million transactions), and Russification (85% Russian officials) [2, pp. 1–200]. They were a response to the January Uprising of 1863–1864 and the region's specifics, where the Polish nobility controlled 60–80% of the land, creating ethnic and social tensions [20, p. 112].

Thus, the comparison of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine with those in the Northwestern Region, the Kingdom of Poland, the central provinces, and European reforms (Prussia 1807–1811, Austria 1848) reveals their uniqueness in combining economic and political objectives.

To elucidate the impact of the reforms on the studied territories, an attempt is made to detail the social and administrative aspects, as well as to examine the reforms' impact on ethnic relations and their effectiveness compared to other regions.

The social changes introduced by decrees Nos. 11 and 15 aimed at integrating peasants and strengthening the economic autonomy of communities. In Right-Bank Ukraine, decree No. 11 (July 1864) permitted communities to engage in alcohol trade, generating up to 5% additional income for 25% of communities, thereby promoting their economic independence [10, p. 25; 12, p. 238]. Decree No. 15 integrated 200,000 free individuals (mainly landless peasants and small leaseholders) into the peasant estate, granting them allotments of 5.2 desiatins [10, p. 28]. In the Northwestern Region, similar measures covered only 150,000 individuals, and community trading rights were less widespread (15% of communities) due to a weaker agrarian economy [16, p. 76]. In the Kingdom of Poland, social integration was limited, as the free land transfer (3–5 desiatins) was not accompanied by additional economic rights such as trade [15, p. 52]. In the central provinces, the 1861 reforms did not provide for the integration of free individuals, and community trading rights were introduced more slowly, covering only 10% of communities by the 1870s [13, p. 182]. In the European context, Prussia (1807–1811) did not grant communities trading rights, and peasant

integration was limited to land redemption (1.8–2.7 desiatins), while in Austria (1848), peasants received land free of charge but without additional economic privileges [16, p. 85]. In Right-Bank Ukraine, social measures were more effective, reducing the number of protests from 200 in 1861–1863 to 50 in 1864–1870, but inequality between peasants and landlords persisted due to high redemption payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin).

The administrative efficiency of the reforms depended on the implementation of decrees Nos. 10, 16, and 20, which regulated land demarcation, transaction accounting, and personnel policy. In Right-Bank Ukraine, decree No. 10 established demarcation commissions that completed 80% of the demarcation of 2 million desiatins by 1873, but bribery (affecting 20–30% of cases) hindered progress until officials' salaries were increased by 50% (decree No. 20) [10, pp. 23, 41]. Decree No. 16 regulated the accounting of 1.5 million redemption transactions, a larger scale than in the Northwestern Region (1 million transactions) due to the greater number of peasant households [10, p. 33]. In the Kingdom of Poland, administrative measures were less complex due to the absence of redemption payments, but a shortage of personnel (only 60% of commissions were staffed) slowed demarcation [15, p. 53]. In the central provinces, voluntary redemption led to chaotic demarcation (only 50% of lands were demarcated by the 1870s), whereas in Right-Bank Ukraine, mandatory redemption (decree No. 17) ensured greater structure [13, p. 180]. In Prussia, the administrative system relied on private banks, which accelerated redemption but led to inequality (30% of peasants lost land), while in Austria, state commissions completed demarcation faster due to free land transfers [16, p. 86]. In Right-Bank Ukraine, the administrative system was more effective than in the central provinces but lagged behind the Kingdom of Poland due to the complexity of redemption procedures.

The reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine had a pronounced ethnic dimension due to Russification (decrees Nos. 18–20), aimed at weakening the Polish

nobility. The sequestration of estates worth 12 million rubles (decree No. 19) and the dismissal of 200 Polish officials (decree No. 20) heightened ethnic tensions, evidenced by 100 cases of sabotage [20, p. 145]. In the Northwestern Region, sequestration (8 million rubles) and the dismissal of 150 officials caused less tension due to lower Polish influence [16, p. 80]. In the Kingdom of Poland, Russification was more intensive (90% Russian officials), but free land transfers reduced social resistance [15, p. 50]. In the central provinces, the ethnic aspect was absent due to the Russian majority, making reforms less conflictual [12, p. 236]. In Prussia and Austria, ethnic conflicts were minimal, as reforms lacked a political aim akin to Russification [16, p. 87]. Russification in Right-Bank Ukraine strengthened imperial control but intensified antagonism between Ukrainian peasants and the Polish elite.

The effectiveness of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine was higher than in the central provinces, where voluntary redemption led to slow redemption (50% by the 1880s) and higher arrears (20%) [13, p. 180]. In Right-Bank Ukraine, 90% of peasants redeemed their allotments by the 1880s due to mandatory redemption and reduced payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin) [12, p. 238]. Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where free land transfers reduced social tensions, arrears in Right-Bank Ukraine (10–15%) indicated a financial burden. In the Northwestern Region, effectiveness was lower due to smaller allotments (4.8 desiatins) and a weaker economy [16, p. 76]. In Prussia, 30% of peasants lost land due to high redemption payments, while in Austria, free transfers ensured broader access to land [15, p. 55]. The reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine achieved economic stability (90% of allotments redeemed) but were limited by ethnic tensions and arrears.

Thus, the comparative analysis demonstrates that the 1864 reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were distinguished by larger allotments (5.2 desiatins), mandatory redemption, and Russification, making them more radical than in the central provinces (3–4 desiatins, voluntary redemption) but less radical than in the Kingdom of Poland (free transfers). Compared to the Northwestern Region,

Right-Bank Ukraine had a larger volume of restored lands (2 million desiatins) and sequestration (12 million rubles) but faced greater resistance from the nobility. In the European context, the reforms combined Prussian redemption and Austrian free transfers, but their uniqueness lay in their political aim—Russification—which strengthened imperial control but exacerbated ethnic conflicts. These characteristics underscore the adaptation of the reforms to the ethnic and political specifics of Right-Bank Ukraine, which will be detailed in the next section on their long-term consequences.

The 1864 agrarian reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine, enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), had far-reaching economic, social, political, and ethnic consequences that influenced the region’s agrarian development, ethnic relations, and the long-term trajectory of modernization in the Russian Empire. The reforms, aimed at completing the abolition of serfdom in 1861, stabilizing the region after the January Uprising of 1863–1864, and weakening the Polish nobility controlling 60–80% of the land, combined land redistribution (2 million desiatins restored to peasants), financial concessions (redemption payment reductions of 10–20%), social integration (200,000 individuals granted peasant status), administration (1.5 million redemption transactions), and Russification (increasing the share of Russian officials to 85%) [1, p. 15].

Continuation of the Presentation of the Main Research Material

The reforms facilitated a significant redistribution of land resources, restoring 2 million desiatins to peasants (decree No. 10), which provided an average allotment of 5.2 desiatins per capita—larger than in the central provinces (3–4 desiatins) or the Northwestern Region (4.8 desiatins) [12, p. 235]. Mandatory redemption (decree No. 17), supported by state loans of 150 million rubles (decree No. 9), enabled 90% of peasants to redeem their allotments by the 1880s, unlike the central provinces, where only 50% completed redemption [10, pp. 35, 22]. Payment reductions of 10–20% (decrees Nos. 12, 19) eased the financial burden for 30% of peasant communities, but arrears (10–15%) indicated

persistent economic pressure [10, pp. 24, 37]. The sequestration of Polish estates worth 12 million rubles (decree No. 19) and privileges for Russian landlords (10% of the redemption amount, decree No. 18) weakened the economic influence of the Polish nobility, leading to the bankruptcy of 500 estates by 1875 [20, p. 145]. Community trading rights (decree No. 11) added up to 5% income for 25% of communities, contributing to economic stability [12, p. 238].

The integration of 200,000 free individuals into the peasant estate (decree No. 15) reduced social tensions, decreasing the number of protests from 200 in 1861–1863 to 50 in 1864–1870 [13, p. 182]. However, inequality between peasants and landlords persisted due to high redemption payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin), which limited access to land for the poorest strata [10, p. 28]. Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where free land transfers (decree of March 2, 1864) eliminated the financial burden, social stability in Right-Bank Ukraine was less pronounced due to arrears [15, p. 50].

Russification, introduced by decrees Nos. 18–20, strengthened imperial control by increasing salaries for Russian officials by 50% and raising their share to 85% in the land administration [10, pp. 36–41]. The dismissal of 200 Polish officials and estate sequestration heightened ethnic tensions, evidenced by 100 cases of sabotage by the nobility [16, p. 80]. Compared to the Northwestern Region, where ethnic tensions were lower due to lesser Polish influence (50–60% of land), the anti-Polish orientation of the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine exacerbated conflicts [20, p. 145].

Demarcation commissions (decree No. 10) completed 80% of the demarcation of 2 million desiatins by 1873, and the accounting of 1.5 million redemption transactions (decree No. 16) improved administrative efficiency [10, p. 23]. However, bribery (20–30% of cases) remained an issue until officials' salaries were increased (decree No. 20). Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where the absence of redemption procedures simplified administration, the complexity of procedures in Right-Bank Ukraine slowed the reforms [15, p. 53].

The reforms laid the foundation for agrarian modernization in Right-Bank Ukraine, fostering peasant landownership. By 1900, 95% of peasant households had redeemed their allotments, a higher rate than in the central provinces (70%) [12, p. 240]. However, high redemption payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desiatin) and arrears (10–15%) contributed to agrarian unrest in 1905–1907, with 150 peasant protests recorded in the region [13, p. 182]. Compared to Austria (1848), where free land transfers facilitated faster agrarian modernization, economic development in Right-Bank Ukraine was hindered by the financial burden [16, p. 86].

The integration of 200,000 free individuals (decree No. 15) and community trading rights (decree No. 11) fostered peasant autonomy, laying the groundwork for the cooperative movement in the 1890s [12, p. 238]. However, inequality between wealthier peasants and the poor intensified due to land intermixing and limited access to capital, distinguishing Right-Bank Ukraine from the Kingdom of Poland, where free transfers reduced social differentiation [15, p. 52].

Russification strengthened imperial control but intensified antagonism between Ukrainian peasants and the Polish nobility, manifesting in anti-Polish sentiments during the 1905–1907 revolution [13, p. 182]. Compared to Prussia, where reforms lacked an ethnic dimension, Russification in Right-Bank Ukraine slowed the formation of Ukrainian national identity, which became evident in the 20th century [20, p. 145].

The 1864 reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine achieved significant successes: the restoration of 2 million desiatins of land, redemption of 90% of allotments, and a reduction in social tensions (from 200 to 50 protests). However, arrears (10–15%), ethnic tensions due to Russification, and the bankruptcy of 500 estates limited their effectiveness [20, p. 145]. Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where free land transfers ensured faster stabilization, the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were less radical but more effective than in the central provinces due to mandatory redemption [15, p. 50]. In the European context, the reforms combined

elements of Prussia (redemption) and Austria (state support), but their anti-Polish orientation was unique [16, p. 87].

Thus, the 1864 reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine achieved economic stabilization (90% of allotments redeemed), social integration (200,000 individuals), and strengthened imperial control, but arrears, ethnic tensions, and administrative challenges limited their success. Compared to other regions and Europe, the reforms were distinguished by a unique combination of redemption, Russification, and large allotments, laying the foundation for agrarian modernization but exacerbating ethnic conflicts. The next section will explore the modern significance of the reforms for land policy.

Conclusions.

The agrarian reforms of 1864 in Right-Bank Ukraine, enshrined in 12 imperial decrees (Nos. 9–20), were a pivotal stage in the transformation of land relations in the Russian Empire, aimed at completing the abolition of serfdom in 1861, stabilizing the region after the January Uprising of 1863–1864, and weakening the Polish nobility, which controlled 60–80% of the land. These reforms integrated land redistribution (restoration of 2 million desiatins), financial mechanisms (10–20% reduction in redemption payments, 150 million rubles in loans), social integration (200,000 individuals granted peasant status), administration (1.5 million redemption transactions), and Russification (increasing the share of Russian officials to 85%) [1, pp. 1–200]. Analysis based on primary sources and works by Western and Ukrainian historians allows us to conclude the following:

First, the 1864 reforms achieved significant economic successes in Right-Bank Ukraine. The restoration of 2 million desiatins of land (decree No. 10) and mandatory redemption (decree No. 17) provided 90% of peasant households with allotments averaging 5.2 desiatins, surpassing the central provinces (3–4

desiatins) and the Northwestern Region (4.8 desiatins) [12, p. 235]. Payment reductions of 10–20% (decrees Nos. 12, 19) alleviated the financial burden for 30% of peasant communities, and trading rights (decree No. 11) added up to 5% income for 25% of communities [2, pp. 87, 108, 145]. However, arrears (10–15%) and the bankruptcy of 500 landlord estates by 1875 indicate limited economic effectiveness, particularly compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where free land transfers eliminated financial pressure [15, p. 50].

Second, the social consequences of the reforms contributed to regional stabilization. The integration of 200,000 free individuals into the peasant estate (decree No. 15) and the granting of trading rights to communities reduced peasant protests from 200 in 1861–1863 to 50 in 1864–1870, laying the foundation for the cooperative movement in the 1890s [13, p. 182]. However, high redemption payments (4.8–6.4 rubles per desyatin) and land intermixing intensified inequality between wealthier peasants and the poor, distinguishing Right-Bank Ukraine from the Kingdom of Poland, where free transfers reduced social differentiation [12, p. 238].

Third, the political and ethnic consequences of the reforms were dual in nature. Russification (decrees Nos. 18–20), which included a 50% salary increase for Russian officials and their share rising to 85% in the land administration, strengthened imperial control but heightened ethnic tensions through the sequestration of Polish estates worth 12 million rubles and the dismissal of 200 Polish officials [2, pp. 145, 187; 20, p. 145]. This tension contributed to anti-Polish sentiments during the 1905–1907 revolution, distinguishing Right-Bank Ukraine from the central provinces, where the ethnic aspect was less pronounced [16, p. 80].

Fourth, the administrative system of the reforms was relatively effective. Demarcation commissions (decree No. 10) completed 80% of land demarcation by 1873, and the accounting of 1.5 million redemption transactions (decree No. 16) ensured a structured process [2, pp. 32, 150]. However, bribery (20–30% of

cases) and a shortage of personnel hindered implementation until salaries were increased (decree No. 20). Compared to the Kingdom of Poland, where the absence of redemption procedures simplified administration, the complexity of procedures in Right-Bank Ukraine reduced efficiency [15, p. 53].

Fifth, in the European context, the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine combined elements of the Prussian reforms of 1807–1811 (mandatory redemption) and the Austrian reforms of 1848 (state support), but their uniqueness lay in their anti-Polish orientation and Russification, which had no analogs in Europe [16, p. 87]. Compared to Prussia, where 30% of peasants lost land due to high payments, and Austria, where free transfers accelerated modernization, the reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine achieved a balance between peasant and landlord interests, but ethnic conflicts limited their success [15, p. 55].

Sixth, the long-term consequences of the reforms were contradictory. Economic stabilization (95% of allotments redeemed by 1900) and peasant autonomy laid the foundation for agrarian modernization, but high payments and arrears contributed to agrarian unrest in 1905–1907 (150 protests) [13, p. 182]. Russification slowed the formation of Ukrainian national identity, evident in the limited participation of peasants in the national movement until the early 20th century [20, p. 145].

In conclusion, the 1864 reforms in Right-Bank Ukraine were successful in economic (90% of allotments redeemed) and social (reduced protests) aspects but were limited by ethnic tensions, arrears, and administrative challenges. Their uniqueness lay in their adaptation to the region's ethnic specifics, distinguishing them from the Kingdom of Poland (free transfers), the central provinces (voluntary redemption), and European reforms.

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