

UDC 339.5

**Honcharenko Olena**

*PhD in Economics, Associate Professor at the Department of World Economy  
State University of Trade and Economics*

**Гончаренко Олена Віталіївна**

*кандидат економічних наук, доцент кафедри світової економіки  
Державний торговельно-економічний університет*

ORCID: 0000-0003-2563-810X

**Novak Olena**

*PhD in Economics, Associate Professor of the Department of World Economy  
State University of Trade and Economics*

**Новак Олена Володимирівна**

*кандидат економічних наук, доцент кафедри світової економіки  
Державний торговельно-економічний університет*

ORCID: 0000-0002-4652-047X

**Ruzhynskas Oleksandr**

*PhD in Economics, Assistant at the Department of World Economy  
State University of Trade and Economics*

**Ружинскас Олександр Віталійович**

*доктор філософії, асистент кафедри світової економіки  
Державний торговельно-економічний університет*

ORCID: 0000-0001-5787-8103

## **THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA ДИНАМІКА МІЖНАРОДНИХ САНКЦІЙ ПРОТИ РОСІЇ**

**Summary.** *Introduction. The initiation of sanctions against the Russian Federation was driven by escalating authoritarian trends, human rights violations, and challenges to the rule of law. Following Russia's aggression against Crimea and Donbas in 2014, the global response intensified, culminating in full-scale sanctions after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The sanctions regime evolved progressively, targeting Russia's internal policies, its military aggression, and its hostile actions towards Western nations.*

*Purpose. The purpose of this study is to analyze the dynamics, effectiveness, and evolving impact of international sanctions on Russia, focusing on key economic sectors, adaptive strategies, and the need for enhanced coordination among sanctioning countries to achieve strategic objectives in global security.*

*Materials and methods. This research uses a systems analysis approach, including comparative analysis, statistical and structural-dynamic methods, and graphical interpretation of empirical data from the "Russia Sanctions Dashboard" (2025). The data covers the types and volumes of sanctions imposed on Russia by January 2025, focusing on differentiation by targets, sanctioning countries, and types of restrictions. The study spans the period from 2022 to August 2025.*

*Results. The sanctions against Russia surged significantly, especially after the 2022 invasion. By August 2025, the sanctions had increased more than ninefold, becoming the most extensive in global sanctions history. The United States, Canada, and the European Union played a dominant role in this escalation, with sanctions targeting various sectors, including finance, energy, and military industries. Despite the significant pressure, Russia's economy adapted by diversifying export markets, particularly in energy, reducing the overall impact of the sanctions.*

*Further research in this area. Future research should focus on evaluating the long-term economic impact of sanctions on key sectors of Russia's economy, particularly those supporting prolonged conflict. Further studies are needed to optimize control mechanisms and improve international coordination to reduce sanction circumvention. Strengthening restrictions on Russian energy exports and*

*lowering their price cap is essential for global security. Ongoing improvement in international cooperation and sanction synchronization is crucial to effectively address evolving geopolitical challenges.*

**Key words:** *geopolitical instability, global security and stability, economic isolation, international sanctions policy, sectoral sanctions.*

**Анотація.** *Вступ. Ініціація санкцій проти росії була зумовлена ескалацією авторитарних тенденцій, порушеннями прав людини та викликами проти верховенства права. Після агресії росії проти Криму та Донбасу в 2014 р., глобальна реакція посилилася, що призвело до введення безпрецедентних санкцій після вторгнення в Україну в 2022 р. Санкційний режим розвивався поступово, орієнтуючись на внутрішню політику росії, її військову агресію та ворожі дії щодо західних держав.*

*Мета. Метою дослідження є аналіз динаміки, ефективності та змінюваного впливу міжнародних санкцій на росію, зосереджуючись на ключових економічних секторах, адаптивних стратегіях та необхідності посилення координації серед країн-санкціонерів для досягнення стратегічних цілей у глобальній безпеці.*

*Матеріали і методи. У дослідженні застосовано підхід системного аналізу, включаючи порівняльний аналіз, статистичні та структурно-динамічні методи, а також графічну інтерпретацію емпіричних даних з "Russia Sanctions Dashboard". Дані охоплюють типи та обсяги санкцій, накладених на росію до січня 2025 р., з фокусом на диференціацію за цілями, країнами-санкціонерами та типами обмежень. Дослідження охоплює період з 2022 по серпень 2025 р.*

*Результати. Санкції проти росії значно зросли, особливо після вторгнення 2022 року. До серпня 2025 року їх кількість збільшилася у понад дев'ять разів, що зробило їх найбільшими за всю історію санкцій у світі. США, Канада та ЄС відіграли провідну роль у цій ескалації, накладаючи санкції на*

різні сектори, включаючи фінанси, енергетику та військову промисловість. Попри значний тиск, економіка росії адаптувалася через диверсифікацію експортних ринків, зокрема в енергетичному секторі, що зменшило загальний вплив санкцій.

*Перспективи.* Подальші дослідження повинні бути зосереджені на оцінці довгострокового економічного впливу санкцій на ключові сектори економіки Росії, особливо ті, що підтримують тривалий конфлікт. Необхідно провести додаткові дослідження для оптимізації механізмів контролю та поліпшення міжнародної координації з метою зменшення обходу санкцій. Посилення обмежень на експорт енергоресурсів з Росії та подальше зниження їх цінової стелі є важливим для глобальної безпеки. Постійне покращення міжнародної співпраці та синхронізації санкцій є ключовим для ефективного реагування на змінювані геополітичні виклики.

**Ключові слова:** економічна ізоляція, геополітична нестабільність, глобальна безпека та стабільність, міжнародна політика санкцій, секторальні санкції.

**Statement of the problem.** The initiation of the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation was driven by the intensification of authoritarian trends, human rights violations, and challenges to the rule of law. The escalation of restrictive measures became evident after Russia's aggression against Crimea and Donbas in 2014, followed by further military crimes and destabilizing actions that posed a global security threat [15]. These sanctions were implemented progressively, initially aiming to induce political corrections within the Kremlin, while minimizing significant economic repercussions for the sanctioning countries. This intricate sanctions architecture is differentiated by targeted objects: Russia's internal policies, its aggression against Ukraine, and its hostile activities towards Western states. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the sanctions regimes expanded cumulatively, resulting in a systemic economic isolation of Russia

[19]. The international community mobilized unprecedented sanctions as a key tool for political and economic pressure, aimed at undermining Russia's military potential. It is important to note that this conflict unfolds not only through military and economic mechanisms but also at ideological and narrative levels, forming adaptive processes in response to challenges to the Liberal International Order, which in turn determines the legitimacy and coherence of the sanctions policy [20].

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** The issue of international sanctions, as a complex legal and political phenomenon, has gained significant relevance amid modern geopolitical instability. Sanctions are seen as tools of coercion and accountability, encompassing various forms, goals, and implementation mechanisms. Hdeshtynskyi D. E. [7] emphasizes the classification of sanctions based on impact measures, implementing bodies, and methods of maintaining public order, which helps clarify their legal nature and role in law enforcement. Plekhov M. V. [14] highlights the lack of a clear definition of "financial-legal responsibility" in Ukrainian legislation, complicating the application of financial sanctions. Marich A. V. [11] discusses the limitations of international organizations like the UN, EU, and IMF in effectively addressing violators, which can lead to the abuse of international law. Karliuga E. K. [9] presents two interpretations of sanctions in international law: a broad one, including individual countermeasures and collective actions, and a narrower approach focused on sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This broader understanding calls for further unification of theoretical approaches and the development of a unified methodology to assess sanctions' impact in the context of evolving international challenges [11; 17].

**The purpose** of the study is to analyze the dynamics, effectiveness, and evolving impact of international sanctions on Russia, focusing on key economic sectors, adaptive strategies, and the need for enhanced coordination to achieve strategic objectives in global security.

**Materials and methods.** The methodological approach to the study of sanction policies is based on the principles of systems analysis, which allows for the

assessment of the economic impact of sanctions as a multifaceted tool of international pressure. The focus is on the concept of "smart sanctions," which target specific economic entities, minimizing the generalized impact on the national economy. This approach reduces negative repercussions on civilian populations and infrastructure while maximizing the effectiveness of sanctions against the aggressor regime.

The research employs comparative analysis, statistical and structural-dynamic analysis, and graphical interpretation of empirical data related to the volume and typology of sanctions implemented by different countries. Empirical data from the "Russia Sanctions Dashboard" [3] has been used, covering information on the types and volumes of sanctions imposed on Russia by January 20, 2025. These data facilitate an object- and sectoral-based differentiation of pressure across targets (individuals, legal entities, vehicles, etc.), initiating countries, and types of restrictions, revealing key trends and changes in the sanction dynamics over time.


The study period spans from 2022 to January 2025, allowing for tracking the evolution of sanctions following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specific attention is given to the analysis of periods of intensified sanctions coinciding with key events in the conflict, such as violations of international law, war crimes, and other significant incidents. The methodology and sources ensure high scientific reliability and reproducibility, with clear data selection criteria and standardized comparative analysis methods, making it feasible for replication by other researchers under similar conditions, thus maintaining the scientific validity of the results. This approach not only facilitates the evaluation of the current state of sanction pressure on Russia but also lays the methodological foundation for further analysis of sanctions' effectiveness in the global context.

**Presentation of the main material of the research.** As of January 20, 2025, the international sanctions policy has undergone significant changes following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 22, 2022. Prior to this, the main targets of sanctions were Iran, Syria, North Korea, and other countries facing sanctions pressure due to internal political crises and human rights violations



[3]. However, after 2022, sanctions against Russia reached an unprecedented scale, driven by violations of international law, war crimes, and territorial annexation. There has also been increased sanction pressure on Belarus due to its involvement in military actions as an ally of Russia, marking a key stage in the transformation of international priorities towards the economic isolation of Russia [15].

The sanction pressure on Russia from 2022 to 2025 demonstrated an unprecedented level of intensity. The number of sanctions against Russia increased more than ninefold, from 2613 to 25691 units, marking the highest figure in global sanctions practice (Figure 1). This surge in sanctions is a direct consequence of Russia's violation of international law and its threat to European security. These sanctions not only limit Russia's access to critical technologies and international financing but have also become the primary tool for holding it accountable for its aggression [19].



**Fig. 1. Dynamics of the total number of sanctions against the Russian Federation and GDP growth rates for the period 02.2022-08.2025, units**

Source: systematically reviewed by the authors based on [3; 18]

The first significant surge in sanctions against Russia occurred after its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with the USA, EU, and UK swiftly responding,

leading to a near-doubling of sanctions in the early days. Initial measures included asset freezes, exclusion from SWIFT, and sanctions on high-ranking officials. By March and April 2022, sanctions increased further after war crimes were verified. By December 2022, sanctions reached 12634 units, and by 2023 and 2024, they intensified, particularly targeting sanctions circumvention and critical technology access, with further increases expected in 2025.

Despite growing sanctions, Russia's economy adapted, shifting export flows and developing ways to bypass restrictions. However, long-term structural constraints are likely to affect Russia's economic stability. By August 2025, the sanctions policy reflected a clear strategy to undermine Russia's military and economic power.

The U.S. leads in the number of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, with 7392 restrictions, reflecting its global influence in finance, security, and technology, as well as the political will of the Biden administration to counter Russia's aggression. The U.S. actively applies secondary sanctions, strengthening the global nature of its sanctions policy, covering various sectors of the economy, including defense and IT. Canada, with 4176 sanctions, ranks second, synchronizing its policy with the US and the UK, focusing on restrictions against media and enterprises in the extractive industry [2]. The EU, with 2782 sanctions, plays a key role in the international sanctions regime, based on a common foreign and security policy aimed at protecting European values [12].

Other countries, such as the UK, France, Switzerland, and Japan, have also imposed sanctions on Russia, with the UK focusing on financial flows and disinformation post-Brexit. Switzerland, while neutral, has imposed 4029 sanctions, largely targeting the financial sector. Despite substantial sanction activity from the West, African nations maintain neutrality, influenced by historical ties and economic interests, which reduces the overall effectiveness of global sanctions. Russia has leveraged strategic cooperation with certain countries to circumvent restrictions, highlighting the multidimensional nature of the sanctions policy, which combines



global consensus and national interests [6; 13; 16]. Understanding the types and scope of these sanctions is crucial for a comprehensive analysis of the sanctions regime.

The largest number of sanctions were imposed on individuals, including high-ranking officials, parliament members, businesspeople affiliated with the military-industrial complex, as well as judges, intelligence officers, and their families. This reflects the policy of personal accountability for supporting military actions and human rights violations, with a total of 13611 sanctions targeting individuals. A significant portion of these sanctions was imposed synchronously by the G7 countries, the EU, and other international partners following the exposure of war crimes in Ukraine [4]. Sanctions targeting legal entities, totaling 9061, aim to paralyze key economic sectors in Russia, such as finance, energy, and defense. These include blocking supply chains and restrictions on the export of technologies used in defense production, as well as sanctions against banks, oil and gas companies, and defense industry enterprises.

The sanctions also targeted maritime vessels, with 1183 units affected, limiting military and commercial supplies, especially oil shipments critical for Russia. An important issue is the "shadow fleet," which helps circumvent sanctions on oil exports, creating serious logistical problems for Russia, especially after restrictions on insurance and access to ports [5]. At the same time, aviation sanctions, though limited to 105 units, hold strategic significance, including bans on the use of Russian aircraft and blocking maintenance services, which have led to a significant reduction in airline revenues and disruption of logistical chains [4]. Additionally, sanctions have restricted Russia's access to international financial markets, including freezing the assets of Russian banks and limiting the issuance of new bonds, resulting in a significant decrease in currency inflows and oil export volumes, which has impacted Russia's GDP and budget [6]. The transnational nature of these sanctions and their complex impact on various sectors of Russia's economy lead to prolonged strategic weakening.

The sanctions imposed by the international community against the Russian Federation following its aggression in Ukraine demonstrate ambivalence in their effectiveness, particularly due to the adaptability of the Russian economy and coordination challenges among G7 countries, which complicate the full implementation of sanctions [8; 21]. While the sanctions have been successful in the geopolitical context, particularly in limiting access to technologies and financing, their effectiveness is limited by circumvention practices, such as through the "shadow fleet" and rising energy costs for EU countries [1; 15]. The effectiveness of the sanctions regime depends on the continuous modernization of control mechanisms, synchronization of measures among coalition members, and the integration of new restrictions to minimize the potential for circumvention [10].

**Conclusions of this research and prospects for further research in this area.** The intensity of the international community's sanctions policy against the Russian Federation continues to grow, reflecting an unprecedented systemic approach to economic pressure on the aggressor state. Since the full-scale aggression in Ukraine in February 2022, sanctions have covered a wide range of sectors—from financial and energy restrictions to personal sanctions and transport sector limitations. Despite the exponential increase in sanctions, their effectiveness has been partially limited due to the resilience of the Russian economy and its ability to adapt, particularly through the diversification of export markets, especially in the energy sector. At the same time, effective counteraction to circumvention schemes, particularly through sanctions on the "shadow fleet" and dual-use technologies, requires continuous policy modernization to maintain its effectiveness.

Future research should focus on assessing the long-term economic impact of sanctions on key sectors of the Russian economy, particularly those crucial for sustaining prolonged conflict. It is also essential to explore optimizing control mechanisms for sanction circumvention and enhancing international coordination to minimize these practices. Strengthening restrictions on Russian energy exports and further reducing their price cap is vital for global security. Continuous improvement

of international cooperation and synchronization of sanctions are key to ensuring an effective response to evolving geopolitical challenges. Ultimately, systemic optimization and adaptation of sanctions policies will maximize their efficacy in achieving global security and stability.

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